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This study examines the financial situation ofthe Farm Credit System Banks
for Cooperatives using comparative analysis for the period 1978 through 1991.
Profitability and leverage measures ofthe Banks for Cooperatives are compared
with similar measures of large commercial banks. The Banks for Cooperatives
werefoundtohaveperformedaswellaslargecommercialbanks. Somedifferences
can be explained as compatible with differences in the goals and objectives of a
cooperative versus an investor-owned firm. Most differences can be attributed to
the financial strength of the Banks for Cooperatives relative to the commercial
banking industry.
Early in the 1980s U.S. agriculture began a period of severe financial
stress. As a result, nonfannbusinessesrelatedtoagriculture, particularly
agricultural lending institutions, suffered their own extended period of
financial stress (Peoples et al. 1992). Agricultural bank failures, though
generally small in size, accounted for more than half of all commercial
bank failures dUring spring and summer 1984. One financial institution
affected most during this period was the Fann Credit System (FCS). The
FCS, authorizedbya seriesofCongressionalActsinthe 1920sand 1930s,
is a group ofuser-owned and controlled financial cooperatives.
Thefinancial problemsoftheFCSinthemid-eightieswerenottheresult
offinancial difficulties of the thirteen Banks for Cooperatives (BCs), the
twelve district Banks for Cooperatives, and the Central Bank. In fact, the
BCs earned a profit in every year ofthe eighties. However, the problems
of the FCS were felt by the BCs since losses were shared by all system
members. The Fann CreditAct of 1987required a mergervote ofthe BCs.
Tenofthe twelve districtBCsandthe CentralBankfor Cooperativesvoted
to merge into a National Bankfor Cooperativesand be renamed CoBank.!
Significantempiricalefforthas focused on the FCSas a unitandon the
Federal Land Bank as a component of the system (Dodson and Bullock
1991). LittleempiricalworkhasfocusedontheBCs,thelendinginstitution
thatservices agricultural cooperativesandrural utilities, includingfinan-
cingexports for itsagribusiness members. Borrowingfrom the BCs repre-
sented 51.3% of the total liabilities of U.S. agricultural cooperatives in
1987 (Royer, Wissman, and Kraenzle 1987).
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ThisarticleevaluatesthefinancialperformanceoftheBCs(thecombined
DistrictsandCentralBank)overthefourteen-yearperiodfrom 1978-1991.
The financial situation of the BCs is compared with similar operating
results for comparably sized commercial banks (banks with assets over
$1 billion) to ascertainthisimportantlender's competitive position. Atthe
end of 1991, combined assets ofthe BCs were $14.5 billion. Forthe same
period the largest 365 U.S. commercial banks had average total assets of
$6.4 billion.
The BCs operate in the highly competitive financial intermediation
industry. Since deregulation began in 1980 this industry has seen
increased price competition, new product development, and the removal
ofmany barriers to entry. This increased competition, alongwith rapidly
changing technology, has produced an industry significantly different
structurally from the industry that existed before the 1980s. Financially
healthy institutions in the industry have a greater chance of survival.
Financiallyweakinstitutionsfail orareabsorbedbythefinanciallysound.
The specific objective ofthis financial appraisalis to assess whetherthe
FCS financial problems of the 1980s and increased market competition
have eroded any inherent competitive advantages the BCs may have had
relative to their commercial counterparts. Similar financial performance
would suggest the BCs operate similarly to commercial banks. Differing
financialperformancewouldbeimportantsincetheleveloffinancial secu-
rityofthelendingcooperativeinfluencesthefinancialhealthofitsmember
patrons. As the cost ofborrowing by the BCs increases or decreases, so
does the cost ofdebt passed on to patron borrowers.
Similar comparisons have been made between financial conditions of
nonfinancial cooperatives and investor-owned firms (IOFs). Schrader et
a1. (1985) observed the financial performance of small cooperative firms
was better than that of small proprietary firms in terms of profitability
and return on total assets. However, they found performance of large
cooperatives was inferior to that of large, proprietary firms. Parliament,
Lerman, and Fulton (1990) found performance ofregional dairy coopera-
tives significantlybetter than that ofcommercial dairies in terms oflever-
age, liquidity, coverage, and efficiencyratiosand notsignificantlydifferent
in terms ofprofitability.
Cooperative Banking versus Commercial Banking
Performance of a financial institution is ultimately determined by the
decisions made to deal with its two primary sources ofrisk: interest rate
risk from its loan portfolio and composition ofits liabilities, and credit or
defaultrisk.2Thereareseveraleconomictheoriesexplaininghowcommer-
cial banks manage their assets and liabilities in the face of these risks
(CooperandFraser1990; Reedeta1. 1980). However, a financialintermedi-
arysuchasthe BCshasdifferentcharacteristicsthana commercialbank.
It would be expected that these different characteristics could lead to
differentoperatingdecisionsandpossiblydifferentperformance. KeyBCs'
characteristics to be discussed are: the form ofownership, the market for
loans (composition ofthe loan portfolio), the source offunds for lending
(composition ofliabilities), and federal sponsored agency status.Financial Appraisal of Bes SurveyjWeldon, Srinami, Moss, and Van Sickle 15
FormofOwnership. Cooperatives differin a verybasicway from inves-
tor-owned firms. As a result, the operation ormanagement decisions ofa
cooperative may bedifferent from that ofan IOF. The BCs operate as an
input supply cooperative providing a broad and growing set offinancial
products and services, The BCs aspire to reduce prices paid (cost ofdebt)
by members for these products.
Earlier studies for modeling cooperative behavior hypothesized the
objective ofcooperatives to be maximizing the total profit, after taxes, of
themembers(Ladd 1982).Thisisincontrasttoassumedmaximizingofnet
worth or shareholder wealth ofan IOF. Theoretically different optimizing
behavior ofcooperatives and IOFs would suggest different levels offinan-
cial performance along with different levels ofrisk.
Market for Loans. The portfolio ofloans for the BCs is, in one sense,
limited to cooperatives serving farmers and ranchers. However, it is also
diversified geographically with national and international loans and by
loans for member borrowers ranging from input supply cooperatives
(includingruralutilities), to food marketing, processing, distribution, and
retailing cooperatives. Commercialbanklending is also highly diversified.
Their loans range from consumer credit cards to loans for construction,
real estate, agriculture, and for commercial and government purposes.
Nondepository Institution. The FCS is different from commercial
banks interms ofacquiringfunds and liability management. Commercial
banks secure most of their funds from deposits-transactions, savings,
and time deposits. Other commercial bank liabilities include borrowing
short term in the federal funds market and the money market.
The BCs acquire funds through the FCS directly from money markets
by selling consolidated system-widebonds, medium-term notes, and dis-
count notes. The effect ofraising funds almost exclusively by the sale of
notesandbondsistoeliminateshorttermliquidityriskfor the BCs.Italso
minimizes liability from management decisions dealing with competitive
pressures for customer deposits. On the other hand, the BCs' liability
management problem is complicated byborrowing intermediate and long
term while providing length-of-term loans and products competing with
those offered by commercial banks.
Federal Sponsored Agency Status. Another aspect of the Banks for
Cooperativesthatdifferentiatesitfrominvestor-ownedbanksistheagency
statusunderwhichtheFCSmarketsitsbonds.Thischaracteristicinvolves
the special relationship between the FCS and the federal government.
Though initially funded by the government, the FCS is now private, but
itis still supervised as an independent agency by the government. It has
been argued that, with this relationship, FCS bonds carry a "dejure" or
"de facto" backing by the federal government (Stigum 1986). Thus,
although the federal governmentis not liable for bonds issued bythe FCS
for the BCs, investors perceive such backing exists and thus reduce the
interest rate demanded.
Evidenceoftheimplicitbackingisbothanecdotalandempirical. Passage
ofthe Farm CreditAct of 1987 is an explicit example ofgovernment sup-
port. Several studies provide empirical evidence that investors perceived
FCS-issued securities similar to Treasury securities (Singer 1991; Moss
and Shonkwiler 1989),16 JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL COOPERATION 1994
Evaluating Bank Performance
Financial bank analysis traditionally evaluates the liquidity, solvency
or leverage, and profitability of the bank (Reed et al. 1980; Fraser and
Fraser 1990). Since historically the BCs are not depository institutions
and have minimal current liabilities, a comparison of liquidity3 is not
applicable. Other important indicators could be considered in evaluating
performance, particularlyinterestrates charged. However, this studywill
focus on the profitability and leverage ofthe financial institutions.
Profitability is an important measure ofthe health and viability ofthe
IOF. This is equallytrue for a cooperative. Interms ofthe operation ofthe
BCs, a positivenetincomeis preferred sinceincomeand expenses cannot
be forecasted perfectly. Net income for the BCs also provides the reserve
surplus needed to build a strong equity position.
Profit is generally measured by net income or net profit after taxes.
Profitabilityis a relative assessment and is measured in this studyas the
ratio ofnet income to assets (ROA) and the ratio ofnet income to equity
(ROE). The ROA evaluates the bank's ability to generate profit from its
assets. However, it ignores the financial structure of the business and
measuresthenetincomegeneratedperdollarofasset. The ROEevaluates
the bank's effectiveness at producing profit from equity and focuses on
thereturnperdollarinvested-animportantconsiderationfortheinvestor
in a commercial bank.
A third measure ofprofit used in this study is the adjusted net interest
margin (Goudreau 1992; FraserandFraser 1990).Theadjustednetinter-
est margin is the net interest revenue (net ofloan loss provisions) minus
interestexpense divided byaverageinterest-earningassets. Thismeasure
correspondstoa firm'sgrossbusinessmargin.Itevaluatesthecorelending
profitabilityoftheinstitutions. Thismeasureisimportantfortworeasons.
First, by subtracting out loan loss provisions, the measure reduces the
impact ofhigh-interest-rate/high-credit-risk loans that increase interest
revenue. This makes the measure more credit risk neutral. Second, it
ignores noninterest revenues associated with the nonlending services of
banking.
The eqUity funds, or total assets minus liabilities, of a bank reflect
the amount of assets owned by the bank owners or member patrons.
Managementofthese eqUityfunds is crucialtobank performance. EqUity
capital protects ag;ainst unexpected losses, ensures solvency, and funds
bank expansion.
The eqUity to asset ratio used in the study indicates the adequacy of
theequitycapitalrelativetotheassetsizeofa bank.Thisleveragemeasure
is important in describing the relationship between the ROA and ROE
measures used in this study.
Analysis ofBank Performance
The source ofthedata for the BCs is the combined statements (balance
sheetandincomestatements) offinancial conditionsfromtheFarmCredit
Administration Annual Report (Farm CreditAdministration 1978-1991).
Commercial bank averages are from reports filed by commercial banksFinancial Appraisal ofBes Survey/Weldon, Srinami, Moss, and Van Sickle 17
with the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (Goudreau 1992; Gou-
dreau and King 1990;Wall 1985). Figures 1,2,3,and 4 graph time-series
observations for the ROA, ROE, adjusted interest margin, and equity to
asset ratios for the Bes and large commercial banks. Actual values are
given in table 1.
Teststatistics4 (Mood, Graybill, andBoes 1974)for determiningwhether
financial ratios are significantlydifferentare presented in table 2. Inaddi-
tion, table 2 gives the averages, standard deviations, and coefficients of
variation for the financial measures.
ROA. Forthe entirefourteen-year period, the ROA for the BCs averaged
.969%, while the average ROA for large commercial banks was .526%.
The standard deviation for the BCs for the entire period was .44, for the
commercial banks .23, and the coefficients ofvariation were .45 and .43
respectively. The test statistic indicates a significant difference in ROAs
overthe entire period. However, thefirst sevenyearsandthesecond seven
years were quite different for both time-series. The ROA for the 1978-84
period averaged 1.33% for the BCs and .59% for commercialbanks, while
for the period 1985-91 the ROA averaged .61% for the BCs and .46% for
commercial banks. Over the 1978 to 1981 period the BCs' asset size,
through increased loan volume, grew from $6.9 billion to $10.4 billion,
while net income grew from $74.1 million to $181.4 million. During the
1982 to 1984 period the BCs started to feel the effects of the financial
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crisis hitting agriculture. Loan volume and assets growth were minimal,
while net income fell 10%.
During the second period, the BCs experienced lower ROAs and much
greatervariability. In 1985netloansfor theBCsfell byover 10%, however,
total assets grew slightly as significantinvestments were made in securi-
ties. Netincomefell significantly, by50%from 1984to 1985.Thisdecrease
in income was the result of three factors attributed to the agricultural
financialcrisis: (1) reductionsinoperatingincomebytheBCs. (2) increases
in loan losses. and (3) the BCs' initial contributions to the losses being
realized bythe otherparts ofthe FCS. In spite ofthese problems, the BCs
were the onlyunit ofthe FCS to earn a positive netincome in 1985. These
problems continued into 1986. Loans and assetvalues fell 10%, whilenet
income fell from $66 million in 1985 to $.6 million in 1986. However,
virtually all ofthe decrease in net income was to provide approximately
$77 million in funds to the other financially weaker FCS units. Over the
last five years ofthe study period, loan and assetvalues grewabout 40%,
and net income was in the $80 to $120 million range, except for 1990
when a large intemationalloan loss reduced income significantly. Since
the restructuring of the FCS the BCs' ROA has improved and in 1991
was .83%.
Duringthis later period commercialbanks also experienced majorvari-
abilityin ROA. Most ofthe decrease in profitabilityin 1987and 1989wasFinancial Appraisal ofBCs Survey/Weldon, Srinami, Moss, and Van Sickle 19
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attributed first to majorlosses on loansmade to developing countries and
later to bad real estate loans,
ROE. FromaninvestorstandpointtheROEofthebankcanbecompared
to alternative or competitive investments. Over the entire period the ROE
of the BCs and commercial banks was 10.6% and 10.4%, respectively.
The correspondence of these values is also reflected in the fact that in
nine years the ROE ofthe BCs exceeded that ofcommercial banks, while
commercialbanks earned on average a higher ROE in five years. The test
statistic indicates no significant difference in the ROE for the lending
institutions.
Between 1978 and 1982 the equity ofthe BCs increased by two-thirds
and peaked at $1.2 billion in 1984. As a result, even though income was
strong dUring the period, ROE fell from 1980 to 1984. In 1985 and 1986
equity decreased, but the previously discussed decreases in income
pushedROEclosetozero. Overthelastfive yearsoftheanalysistheequity
position ofthe BCs stabilized at about $1 billion.
Adjusted Net Interest Margin. The adjusted net interest margin aver-
aged 1.22% for the BCs and 3.20% for commercial banks, a difference of
1.98%. Mean values tested significantly different for the fourteen-year
period. The coefficient ofvariation is similar for the two.20 JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL COOPERATION 1994
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The margin trended up for the BCs, while the commercialbankingmar-
gin trended down causing the difference to narrow. In 1978 the gap was
2.95%, while in 1991 the gap had narrowed to 1.11%. This change in the
differencecanbeattributed to two ofthe threemeasuresused to calculate
the net interest margin. Commercial banks had a significantly higher
interest revenue rate over the period (figure 5), but a significantly worse
loanlossasa percentofinterestearningassets (figure6). Interestexpenses
as a percentage ofinterest earning assets were not significantly different
(figure 7). However, whathadbeena minimal differenceinloanloss (.15%)
had increased to where the loan losses of commercial banks exceeded
those ofthe BCs by 1.15%.
Equity to Asset, Over the 14-year period commercial banks were sig-
nificantly more leveraged than the BCs. The average equity to asset ratio
was 9.6%fortheBCsand 5.2%for commercialbanks.This leveragediffer-
enceisnotsurprisingsincecommercialbanksareperhapsthemosthighly
leveraged firms operating nationally.
The BCs' highest equity to asset was 12.5% in 1982 when they had an
equity position close to $1.2 billion. Since then, the equity to asset ratio
fell to 6.8% in 1991. This reduction came from an increase in assets and
a decrease in equity. Assets were 50%greaterin 1991 compared to 1982,
while equity was $200 million smaller. The decrease in equity was split
between reduced capital and reduced reserved earnings.Table l.-ROA, ROE, Equity to Asset and Net Adjusted Interest Margin
Year Return on Return on Equity to Net Adjusted Net Interest Net Interest Net Loan
Assets Equity Asset Ratio Interest Revenue Expense Loss
Margin
(percent)
BCs Comm. BCs Comm. BCs Comm. BCs Comm. BCs Comm. BCs Comm. BCs Comm.
1978 1.13 0.61 11.09 12.70 10.40 4.80 1.22 4.17 8.81 na. 7.33 na. 0.26 na.
1979 1.06 0.64 13.97 13.80 9.45 4.64 0.95 3.57 10.85 12.66 9.57 8.76 0.33 0.33
1980 1.41 0.61 18.92 13.40 9.09 4.55 1.08 3.46 12.05 14.61 10.78 10.80 0.20 0.35
1981 1.71 0.61 17.16 13.17 10.89 4.63 1.10 3.49 13.81 17.45 12.45 13.59 0.26 0.36
1982 1.56 0.57 13.39 12.16 12.54 4.69 0.99 3.41 12.74 15.60 11.59 11.65 0.16 0.54
1983 1.16 0.54 9.74 11.10 11.33 4.86 1.16 3.30 10.41 12.70 9.14 8.76 0.12 0.64
1984 1.31 0.54 11.20 10.51 11.98 5.14 1.19 3.55 11.18 13.27 9.90 8.98 0.09 0.73
1985 0.64 0.67 5.59 12.53 10.98 5.35 1.43 3.30 9.91 11.33 8.24 7.26 0.25 0.76
1986 0.01 0.65 0.05 11.84 10.95 5.49 1.26 3.06 8.65 9.93 7.26 5.99 0.14 0.88
1987 0.76 -0.15 7.57 -2.80 9.29 5.27 1.31 1.98 7.94 9.81 6.70 5.98 -0.07 1.84
1988 0.71 0.89 8.40 16.40 7.65 5.43 1.25 3.55 8.84 10.87 7.49 6.66 0.09 0.66
1989 0.78 0.35 10.88 6.21 6.78 5.65 1.37 2.61 9.55 11.90 8.24 7.96 -0.06 1.33
1990 0.51 0.39 7.64 6.86 6.45 5.64 1.19 2.60 9.02 11.49 7.64 7.58 0.20 1.31
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Table 2.-Averages, Standard Deviations, Coefficients ofVariation,
and T Statistics
Performance Standard
Measure Average Deviation T stat. Coef. Variation
BCs Comm. BCs Comm. BCs Comm.
(percent)
ROA 0.969 0.526 0.4389 0.2264 3.2339 0.4528 0.4300
ROE 10.579 10.384 4.5949 4.5711 0.1088 0.4343 0.4402
Equity to Capital 9.615 5.156 1.9500 0.4498 8.0333 0.2028 0.0872
Adjusted Net Interest 1.223 3.199 0.1721 0.5323 -12.74 0.1406 0.1664
Interest Revenue 10.0923 12.4392 1.7833 2.2228 -2.921 0.1767 0.1787
Interest Expense 8.7162 8.4554 1.8698 2.2647 0.3149 0.2145 0.2678
Net Loan Loss 0.1527 0.8562 0.1111 0.4544 -5.402 0.7277 0.5308
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The equity to asset ratio for commercial banks was lowest in 1980 at
4.55%, but has trended steadilyup overthe last elevenyears. Part ofthis
can be explained by the increased number ofbanks that moved into the
classification of banks with assets over $1 billion. Part of this increase
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yearsthe equitytoassetratiohasincreased for all size categoriesofbanks
(Goudreau 1992).
The test statistic for this ratio indicates a significantdifference between
the means of the two lending institutions. However. in 1991 the equity
to asset ratio was 6.8% and 6.0% for the BCs and commercial banks
respectively. This .8% difference is small compared to the 5% and 6%
differences measured in the early 1980s.
Conclusions
ResultsofthecomparativeanalysisindicatethattheBanksfor Coopera-
tiveswithstoodthefinancial turmoilandrestructuringofthe 1980s. Impli-
cations for cooperative borrowers are that a lending institution has sur-
vived for the 1990s that is financially strong and competitive with other
lending intermediaries~
Over the fourteen-year period the ROA of the BCs was significantly
superiortothatoflargecommercialbanks.Thedifferencewouldhavebeen
even greater except for the net income losses incurred due to problems in
other parts of the FCS. Even though the ROA in recent years has not
recoveredtoprefinancialcrisismagnitudes.itstillisata levelthatsuggests
the BCsare efficientlymanaging theirportfolio ofloans. Theyare generat-24 JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL COOPERATION
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ingprofitwhile, atthe same time, providingmember-borrowers verycom-
petitively priced credit.
The BCs' ROE was not significantly different from that of commercial
banks, while the BCs' equity to asset ratio was superior but approaching
that of commercial banks. The competitive ROE is another indication of
sound financial performance. Moreover, the BCs generated the similar
ROE with lower leverage. The equity to asset ratio is consistentwith how
cooperatives operate. Itis also in linewith capital adequacyrequirements
imposed on the BCs bythe Farm CreditAdministration as a consequence
ofthe Farm Credit Act.
The low adjusted net interest margin is consistent with differences in
operating objectives of a cooperative versus an investor-owned firm. It is
facilitated by the BCs' nondepository situation and federal agency status
that allow it to borrow money at rates comparable with large commercial
banks. The lower margin dUring the period provided a lower cost ofdebt
for BCs' member-borrowers compared to the cost ofdebt they could have
obtained from commercial banks. In addition, the low loan loss rates of
the BCs were below those of commercial banks as the BCs apparently
were marketing loans to a financially strong cooperative industry.
The BCs' management practices over the lastfourteen years in a highly
competitive international industry resulted in the adequate to superiorFinancialAppraisal ofBes Survey/Weldon, Srinami, Moss, and Van Sickle 25
profitabilityand leverage measured in this study, Though not specifically
quantified in this study, the performance of the BCs is probably closely
related to the economic health ofthe market it serves.
Notes
1. The cooperative banks ofSt. Paul, Minnesota, and Springfield, Mas-
sachusetts, remain as independent Banks for Cooperatives, but are
authorized to make loans nationally. CoBankhas the authority to lend to
national and international agricultural cooperatives.
2. Inflation and fraud risk are also important but have a similar effect
on all financial institutions.
3. One result ofthe Farm CreditAct of 1987 is that minimum liquidity
standards are imposed on the BCs by the Farm Credit Administration.
Consequently, today liquidity is significantly more important to the BCs.
4. The test statistic used:
Vnlnd(nj + n2)(Xj+X2)
T=------r==========
V[~(Xli-xd2+ ~(x2i-x2)21 / (nj + n2 - 2)
has a t distribution with n l + n2 - 2 degrees offreedom.
References
Cooper, S.. and D. Fraser. 1990. Thejinancial marketplace. Reading. Massachusetts: Addi-
son-Wesley Publishing Company.
Dodson. C., andJ.B. Bullock. 1991. AnalysisoftheviabilityofFarmCreditSystembanksand
combinedassociations byFarm CreditSystemdistricts. Research Bulletin 1064. Columbia.
Missouri: Missouri Agricultural Experiment Station.
Farm CreditAdministration. Various issues 1978 to 1991. Annual report. Mclean, Virginia.
Fraser, D.. and L. Fraser. 1990. Evaluatingcommercialbankperformance. RollingMeadows,
Illinois: Bankers Publishing Company.
Goudreau. R.. and B.F. King. 1990. Recovering bank profitability: Spoiled again by large
banks' loan problems. Economic Review. Federal Reserve Bank ofAtlanta, 75:30-43.
Goudreau. R. 1992. Commercial bank profitability rises as interest margins and securities
sales increase. Economic Review. Federal Reserve Bank ofAtlanta. 77:33-52.
Ladd, G. 1982. The objective of the cooperative association. Development and applications
ofcooperative theoryandmeasurementofcooperativepeiformance.Proceedingsofa sympo-
sium at the annual MEA meeting. 1981, at Clemson, South Carolina. USDA ACS Staff
Rep.. Washington. D.C.
Mood, A. F. Graybill. and D. Boes. 1974. Introduction to the theory ofstatistics. New York:
McGraw Hill Book Company.
Moss. Co, andJ. Shonkwiler. 1989. An empirical investigation ofthe effect ofriskin agricul-
ture on the interest rate of Farm Credit System bonds. Selected Paper presented to the
MEA Meeting. August. at Baton Rouge. Louisiana.
Parliament. C.. Z. Lerman. and J. Fulton. 1990. Performance ofcooperatives and investor-
owned firms in the dairy industry. Journal ofAgricultural Cooperation 5:1-16.
Peoples. K, D. Freshwater. G. Hanson. P. Prentice, and E. Thor. 1992. Anatomy of an
American agricuLLural credit crisis. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
Inc.
Reed E.. R. Cotter. E. Gill. and R. Smith. 1980. Commercial banking. 2d ed. Englewood Cliffs.
NewJersey: Prentice Hall.
Royer. J .. R. Wissman. and C. Kraenzle. 1987. Farmer cooperativejinancial projiles. USDA.
ACS Research Report no. 91. Washington. D.C.
Schrader, L.. E. Babb. R. Boynton, and M. Lang. 1985. Cooperative andproprietary agribusi-
ness: Comparison ofpeTjormance. Agr. Exp. Stat. Bull. 982. (April). W. Lafayette. Indiana:
Purdue University.26 JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL COOPERATION 1994
Singer, M. 1991. The systematic risk ofFarm Credit bonds: An event studyanalysis. Paper
presented to the SAEA annual meetings, February, at Fort Worth, Texas.
Stigum, M. 1986. U.S. government and federal agency securities. Handbook ojfinancial
markets. 2d ed. ed. F.J. Fabozzi and F.G. Zarb. Homewood, Illinois: Dow Jones-Irwin.
Wall L. 1985. Profitsin '85: Largebanksgainwhile otherscontinue to lag. EconomicReview,
Federal Reserve Bank ofAtlanta, 71:18-31.